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"There are some people-and I am one of them-who think that the
most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the
universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important
to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy.
We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to
know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's
philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos
affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them."
W ITH THESE WORDS from Chesterton's Heretics, William James in
19061 in Boston opened the famous series of lectures that launched
pragmatism on its career of conquest. 2 Here in the home town of his
great pragmatic ally, Mr. Justice Holmes, was a revolutionary event,
unspectacular, marked by no Boston massacre, by no dramatic dumping
of tea in the harbor or shot heard 'round the world, but by a silent,
invisible but powerful impetus towards an erosion of the philosophical
bases of the natural law.
Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1 JAMES, PRAGMATISM 3 (1931).
2 On May 4, 1907, William James wrote to his brother concerning his "little book
called PRAGMATISM": "I shouldn't be surprised if ten years hence it should be rated
as 'epoch-making,' for of the definitive triumph of that general way of thinking I can
entertain no doubt whatever-I believe it to be something quite like the protestant
reformation." 2 JAMES, LETTERS 279 (H. James ed. 1920). In a letter of August 4,
1908 to John Dewey, James wrote, "That it is the philosophy of the future, I'll bet
my life." Id. at 310.
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There is, said James,
a curious fascination in hearing deep things
talked about, even though neither we nor
the disputants understand them. We get
the problematic thrill, we feel the presence
of the vastness. Let a controversy begin in
a smoking-room anywhere, about free-will
or God's omniscience, or good and evil
and see how everyone in the place pricks
up his ears. 3
In this year we cannot imagine people
pricking up their ears when God's omni-
science or free will is mentioned. What is
more, as indicating how far we have trav-
elled since 1906 when James spoke these
words, who can imagine men of today
discussing such subjects either in a
smoking-room or elsewhere? Indeed, it
seems clear that if today during a lull in
the conversation about the health of Presi-
dent Eisenhower, the atom bomb, or one's
game of golf, or the Cleveland Browns,
the Communists or the Dodgers, one were
to say: "Well, fellows, what do you think
of God's omniscience?", they would think
he was crazy. So, too, I suppose they would
if one started to talk about natural law.
And yet natural law is the most natural
thing in the world. Indeed in a sense there
would be an appeal to natural law if a
man were to complain to his wife because
she was using his razor to open a can
of beans.
For every being, man for example,
should act according to the law of its being,
that is to say, in accordance with what it
really is, or better, in accordance with its
primary purpose. If man's purpose is to
love God and serve Him in this world
and to be happy with Him in the world
to come, then he should act accordingly.
3 JAMES, PRAGMATISM 5 (1931).
His conduct should be in harmony with
his nature, in furtherance of his "being,"
in accordance with natural law which is
the participation
in the eternal law
of an ordered uni-
verse by man as a
rational creature.
There is not space
here to discuss at
any length the
philosophical ba-
ses of the natural
law- God, being,
man as a rational,
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We merely recall to mind the primary
principle of the natural law: "Good is to
be done; evil is to be avoided," and
secondary principles such as those in the
second table of the Decalogue and the right
to life, liberty and property, the obligation
to give every man his due, the principle of
justice that runs like a golden thread
through the law. And there is the principle
that agreements should be kept: the basis
not only of the structure of business and of
order and of daily life within nations, but
the only basis of international law and the
only hope for world peace.
Natural law has had a notable history.
Having its roots in Greek philosophy, it
was developed by Cicero and the Roman
jurists who gave law to the western world.
It was assimilated to the law of nations and
exemplified in canon law. Its sovereignty
was generally theoretically and often practi-
cally acknowledged by kings and peoples
during the medieval centuries. It was the
basis of that higher-law doctrine which is
fundamental to constitutional liberty. In
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the tide of Anglo-American freedom there
is John of Salisbury, Bracton, Fortescue,
Stephen Langton, the great churchman who
led in wresting Magna Carta from the
reluctant hand of King John at Runnymede,
St. Thomas h Becket, slain at the altar, St.
Thomas More, gaily laying his head upon
the block rather than to acknowledge the
totalitarian pretensions of the sovereign of
his day. There is Lord Coke, oracle of the
Common Law, itself permeated with
natural law, denying the divine right of
James I at peril of his life, our revolutionary
forefathers who used the natural law as
the most powerful weapon of their polem-
ical arsenal in their appeal to the opinion
of mankind that preceded the resort to
arms and whose doctrine found its flower-
ing in the flaming phrases of Jefferson in
the declaration of unalienable rights. But
the great culmination of more than twenty
centuries of blood and tears by named
heroes and unsung anonymous generations
in championship of the natural law as a
higher law came in the Constitution of the
United States, for this was founded on
natural law.
For one hundred and fifty years before
the revolution this had been the accepted
teaching in American colleges and univer-
sities. This was the orthodox and general
teaching almost until the Civil War. And
this was natural since all educational
institutions in the pre-revolutionary period
and for long afterward were governed and
maintained by religious groups. For a long
time after the revolution most American
college presidents were clergymen and
courses in moral philosophy were com-
pulsory. So it was not strange that natural
law was accepted by Marshall and Story
and Chancellor Kent and practically all of
the American bench and bar. It was only
after secularism and pragmatism had done
their work that the time came when true
natural law was unknown to most Ameri-
cans and all so-called natural law was
regarded with contempt and as something
no longer worth considering.
And since pragmatism played so vital a
part in this erosion of natural law in
America we come now to that method, or
point of view, or attitude towards life and
the cosmos-to this philosophy or pseudo-
philosophy or substitute for philosophy.
Though there is pragmatism in ancient
Greek philosophy, and there are many
varieties of pragmatism, we take, as best
illustrative, William James. As he pointed
out, the word pragmatism comes from the
Greek word meaning "action" from which
come our words "practice" and "practical."
James says:
"A pragmatist turns his back resolutely
and once for all upon a lot of inveterate
habits dear to professional philosophers. He
turns away from abstraction and insuf-
ficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad
a priori reasons, from fixed principles,
closed systems, and pretended absolutes
and origins. He turns toward concreteness
and adequacy ,towards facts, towards action
and towards power."' 4
Theories thus become instruments. ...
[Pragmatism] agrees with nominalism ...
in always appealing to particulars; with
utilitarianism in emphasizing practical
aspects; with positivism in its disdain for
verbal solutions, useless questions and
metaphysical abstractions." 5
In the first place it is an attitude or method.
It is also a theory of truth.
4 Id. at 51.
5 Id. at 53.
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Ideas become true just insofar as they
help us to get into satisfactory relation with
other parts of our experience. . . . Any
idea upon which we can ride, so to speak;
any idea that will carry us prosperously
from any one part of our experience to
any other part, linking things satisfactorily,
working securely, simplifying, saving labor,
is true for just so much, true in so far
forth, true instrumentally.6
A new opinion counts as "true" just in
proportion as it gratifies the individual's
desire to assimilate the novel in his experi-
ence to his beliefs in stock. It must both
lean on old truth and grasp new fact; and
its success ... in doing this, is a matter for
the individual's appreciation. When old
truth grows, then, by new truth's addition,
it is for subjective reasons. 7
That new idea is truest which performs
most felicitously its function of satisfying
our double urgency. It makes itself true,
gets itself classed as true, by the way it
works. . . . Purely objective truth . . . is
nowhere to be found.8
[A]n idea is "true" so long as to believe
it is profitable to our lives. 9
Pragmatism is willing to take anything,
to follow either logic or the senses .... Her
only test of probable truth is what works
best in the way of leading us. 10
"The true," to put it very briefly, is only
the expedient in the way of our thinking,
just as "the right" is only the expedient in
the way of our behaving. Expedient in
almost any fashion; and expedient in the
long run and on the whole, of course; for
what meets expediently all the experience
in sight won't necessarily meet all farther
experiences equally satisfactorily .... [W]e
have to live today by what truth we can
get today and be ready tomorrow to call
it falsehood. Ptolemaic astronomy, cucilid-
6 Id. at 58.
7 Id. at 63.
78 Id. at 64.
,9 Id. at 75.
A0 Id. at 80.
ian space, aristotelian logic, scholastic
metaphysics, were expedient for centuries,
but human experience has boiled over
those limits, and we now call these things
only relatively true, or true within those
borders of experience. "Absolutely" they
are false. . . .11
Of course there is much more to James
than this, and, of course, one could pause
on many of his sentences and point out
inconsistencies, illogicalitiesi differing uses
of the same term, vagueness, fallacies and
philosophical errors.
The main point is that here is a denial
of the idea of truth as the conformity of
subjective judgments or ideas to objective
reality. What is true today may not be
true tomorrow. What is true for you since
it is something that works for you and
which you find satisfactory is not neces-
sarily true for me. It is all a matter of
personal opinion, of individual likes and
dislikes.
Here is a denial of absolutes, of uni-
versals, of metaphysics. On these the prag-
matist turns his back and turns towards
adequacy, that is to say towards efficiency,
"towards facts, towards action and towards
power.'12 Here is the flight from reason;
here is the antithesis and enemy of natural
law. Here are the Sophists come to life.
And here is anti-intellectualism. For James
speaks of the "trail of the serpent of
rationalism, of intellectualism."' 13 "Abso-
lutism ... [is] remote and vacuous." 14 So
he says:
[W]e find men of science preferring to turn
their backs on metaphysics as on something
11 Id. at 222, 223.
12 Id. at 51.
13 Id. at 19.
14 Id. at 20.
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altogether cloistered and spectral, and
practical men shaking philosophy's dust off
their feet and following the call of the
wild. 15
Americans were proverbially practical
men. And did they shake philosophy's dust
off their feet? Did they follow the call of
the wild? Did they come to worship action,
efficiency and power?
This brings us to the reasons for what
James hoped for and called the "conquer-
ing destiny" of pragmatism. For it is
generally conceded to be the prevailing
American philosophy. Why was it con-
genial to America? What streams of emo-
tion and of thought contributed to its
conquests? Of course there were many
philosophical influences, some coming from
European philosophers. And here one must
generalize without finesse or the qualifica-
tions that completeness of statement would
require if space permitted.
The evolutionary theory of Darwin's
Origin of Species, published in 1859-the
year of John Dewey's birth-had many
ramifications and repercussions. It shat-
tered the religious faith of millions who had
accepted literally the seven days' account
of creation in Genesis as referring to
twenty-four hour days. It destroyed their
belief in God or caused them to turn to
the physical sciences as the god of a newer
and better revelation. Applied to society
and the struggle for economic existence it
stamped with the approval of the evolu-
tionary process any conduct of the indi-
vidual which worked towards success,
regardless of ethics or morality. Action was
glorified. Efficiency was stamped with
nature's approval (and Nature was spelled
with a big "N"). The end justified the
15 Id. at 23.
means. That was good, that was true,
which worked.
This fitted in with laissez faire and the
idealization of atomic individualism, the
glorification of individual selfishness as
producer of the common good. But here
was abdication of the social responsibility
of man, denial of his social nature and the
restraints of natural law flowing therefrom.
And for many imbued with evolutionary
theories change was the law of life. The
past, including traditions embodying age-
long experiences of the race, was dis-
credited. The new was presumptively the
true. And so principles must be adapted to
changed conditions, not conditions to prin-
ciples. If necessary the principles were to
be discarded. Whirl was king. All things
flowed. And not until later were men to
discover that there was no well of being
amidst the wastelands of drifting dunes
and shifting sands. Later they were to
search for the rock of certainty.
But meantime evolution was allied to
the cult of progress. All change was good,
since the movement of the species under
the iron compulsion of scientific law was
necessarily always upward and onward.
And to Americans all this seemed con-
firmed by what they saw about them. Had
not man mastered his environment, un-
locked nature's deepest secrets, brought
heaven down to earth? Was he not making
his own Garden of Eden? What need had
he of God? Or was not he God himself?
Particularly did this anthropocentric hu-
manism appeal to Americans who in single
generations saw their environment, material
and social, completely change, who saw
the conquest of a continent, the trans-
formation of a single agrarian or small-
town society into a complex, closely inte-
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grated, swiftly moving civilization of metro-
politan millions. For men in one long life-
time or two passed from ox-cart and tal-
low candle and homespun to airplane and
electrons and a gadgeteering civilization
produced by assembly-line methods. Why
should these millions not believe in the
beneficence of change and the inevitability
of progress?
Furthermore, evolutionary theories af-
fected philosophy and ethics and law and
the social sciences. Anthropologists not
only emphasized differences among men
rather than their common rationality and
universally basic principles of conduct,
they played upon changes in men's points
of view and opinions and in the institutions
that implemented them or gave them ex-
pression: interminable change down the
generations in cultures and religion. There
was the conclusion that religion generally
is but a hangover of savage superstitions
and taboos. Morals were based on no uni-
versal, eternal truths, on no ontological
principles. They became merely the mores,
the changing customs of the masses, pro-
duced by irrational uncontrollable and
uncontrolled forces. Thus in 1906, the
very year of these James lectures, Sumner's
book Folkways came out of Boston pro-
foundly to affect the thought and morals
of millions of the first half of the twentieth
century-of many who never heard his
name.
The kinship of Sumner's Folkways with
pragmatism is apparent from such words
as these:
Men begin with acts, not with thoughts.
. . . The ability to distinguish between
pleasure and pain is the only psychical
power which is to be assumed. Thus ways
of doing things were selected, which were
expedient. 16
The folkways . . . are not creations of
human purpose and wit . . . they are like
the instinctive ways of animals, which are
developed out of experience .... 17
The notion of right is in the folkways. It
is not outside of them.... In the folkways,
whatever is, is right .. "Rights" are the
rules of mutual give and take in the com-
petition of life which are imposed on
comrades in the in-group .... Therefore
rights can never be "natural" or "God.
given," or absolute in any sense.... World
philosophy, life policy, right, rights, and
morality are all products of the folkways.18
[T]he great mass of any society lives a
purely instinctive life just like animals....
The masses are the real bearers of the
mores of the society .... The folkways are
their ways. 19 . . . Institutions and laws are
produced out of mores. 20
And a concluding quotation from Sumner's
Folkways sounds like Mr. Justice Holmes:
Nothing but might has ever made right.
• . . If a thing has been done and is estab-
lished by force ... it is right in the only
sense we know ... [M]ight has made all the
right which ever has existed or exists now.2 1
And then there was secularism. The
pagan Renaissance's centering of the uni-
verse on Man rather than God or any
absolutes came to fruition when twentieth
century man saw, or thought he saw him-
self master of his environment. The indus-
trial revolution produced the bourgeois
mind; some scholars said that the Protes-
tant ethic stimulated the development of
16 SUMNER, FOLKWAys 2 (1913).
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id. at 28, 29.
19 Id. at 45, 46.
20 Id. at 53.
21 Id. at 65, 66.
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modern capitalism 22 and with it came the
type of person who keeps his religion for
Sundays and on the other days of the
week concentrates on the pursuit of mate-
rial gains. The week days are for "moral
holidays," as James would say. Worldly
goods were signs of God's election; mani-
fest proofs of virtue. In America the en-
vironment beckoned towards materialism,
placed a premium on practicality, was un-
congenial to philosophy or reflection.
Everything called for action, efficiency,
power: the forest primeval yearning for the
axe, the prairie for the plow, the natural
resources of a virgin continent. In the mad,
competitive race everything called for
speed; there was no time for reflection or
for theory. The thing to do was to act
first and judge afterwards by processes of
trial and error.
And as the railroads spanned the con-
tinent, towering cities rose above the plain
and all the world applauded America's
inventive, productive and material prog-
ress, the great financier or industrialist
replaced poet, prophet, statesman and the
man of God as object of the hero worship
of the practical minded American people.
And the tendency towards materialism was
accelerated by the mass appeal of Amer-
ican advertising methods leading millions
to believe that each should keep up with
22 20, 21 WEBER, DIE PROTESTANTISCHE ETHIK
UND DER GEIST DES KAPITALISMUS IN ARCHLY
FUR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK
(1904-05); WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Parsons transl. 1930);
TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITAL-
IsM (1926); FANFANI, CATHOLICISM, PROTES-
TANTISM AND CAPITALISM (1936); See TROELTSCH,
THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCHES (1931); For a criticism see STRAUSS,
NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 60 n. 22, and
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 574.
the Joneses, that no one should ever admit
that there was anything that he could not
afford, that only temporal happiness counts
and that such happiness is impossible with-
out a plenitude of material possessions-
particularly the latest gadget-whether it
be color television or an electric pencil
sharpener. And of course the secularization
of American society resulted from the
decay of religious faith. It was not so much
that religion had been refuted as that it
had come to be abandoned, to be passed
by as unimportant because of the progress
of skepticism, materialism and indiffer-
entism. It no longer mattered.
Not only in religion but in all fields of
thought there was a kind of liberalism that
concentrated on tolerance. It didn't mat-
ter what you thought provided you had an
"open mind." But the tolerance in many
cases was only an excuse for indolence.
Only too often men faced with contro-
versial questions of great consequence to
themselves and to society laid to their
souls the flattering unction that they were
tolerant when in fact they were only too
lazy to come to grips with difficult prob-
lems. And so the so-called open mind often
became the vacant mind, a veritable cave
of the winds without any convictions solid
enough to offer resistance to passing moods
of public emotion, of fancy or of fashion-
able thoughts. The net result was a skepti-
cism-one man's opinion was as good as
another's - this was sound democratic
dogma-and finally it didn't make much
difference anyhow. And so you had indif-
ference which made it all the easier to
concentrate on the pursuit of wealth and
enjoyment of the rich fleshpots of Amer-
ican life.
APRIL, 1956
Not only was pragmatism strengthened
by evolutionary theories and the doctrine of
progress-by anthropology, sociology, the
secularization of society and indifferentism.
Developments in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century social and physical sci-
ences prepared the minds of many Amer-
icans for the sewing of the seeds flung
broadcast by James and his adherents. The
newer social sciences, whose students as
mid-twentieth century approached ran into
the tens of thousands, witnessing the tri-
umphs of the physical sciences, decided to
ape their methods. Principally this was in
two respects: first, the concentration on
inductive facts, on the "is" rather than the
"ought." This meant the scrupulous exclu-
sion of ethics, morality and religion from
economics, history, sociology and political
science. Secondly, there was to be a high
degree of specialization. This meant a sep-
aration of the social sciences not only from
ethics and religion but from each other and
from philosophy. This meant progress, but
it had two bad effects. First there was a
shrinking of men working in the field and
of the men they were studying into less
than whole men. The professor too often
became less than a whole man-and he
saw only a small section of the universe;
he peered through his miscroscope at the
specimen on his slide and saw only the
economic man, or the political man, or the
social: he never saw a whole man. A sec-
ond result of overspecialization was that
inevitably men were buried under a Vesu-
vian deluge of the ashes of discrete fact,
chaotic, confusing, brought into no pat-
tern of intelligibility by any synthesizing
philosophy. And the lack of a common
philosophy led these men to speak varying
languages: it prevented their agreement on
the nature and purpose of man, or of the
universe or of the purposes of society and
of government and of law. The situation
here was similar to that in the world of
education. Public educators, not agreed on
ultimates, on the nature and purpose of
man, were not agreed on the purpose of
education and therefore pragmatically con-
centrated on methods without a unifying
philosophy. So the educational world was
in a state of confusion.
Not only did the social sciences support
pragmatism but so did the physical sci-
ences which became increasingly mate-
rialistic. Since only that mattered which
could be measured, counted, weighed,
treated in terms of statistical averages or
acted upon in a test tube, since metaphysics
and philosophy were shunned, there was no
room for such things as natural law, to
say nothing of the supernatural from
which it drew much of its strength. Here
too, its was only the practical results, the
tangible achievements of science mani-
fested in industry and invention that
counted. Here too, the great test of truth
was workability, efficiency, material results.
And when after the end of the nineteenth
century science lost its dogmatic faith in
itself and confessed its doubts and limita-
tions, when certitude was replaced by prob-
ability as the best scientists could offer,
men who had turned from God to science
as the only rock of certitude in a fluid
universe, gave up in despair and said,
"There is no truth."
The faith in man as self-sufficient
master of his environment and in the in-
evitability of progress was shattered by the
First World War, the disillusionment and
cynicism that followed it, by a flood of
debunking biographies, by the Great De-
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pression, by theories of rationalization
and those of the most popular of the
newer sciences, psychology, and by the
semanticists.
War and depression proved the irra-
tionality of man; best selling books told
men that they were creatures who acted
blindly on impulse and later invented
theories to justify their conduct. Had not
James pointed out that a philosopher's tem-
perament "really gives him a stronger bias
than any of his more strictly objective
premises; '23 that "[T]emperaments with
their cravings and refusals do determine
men in their philosophies, and always
will."' 24 But said James: "Temperament is
no conventionally recognized reason, so
[the philosopher] urges impersonal reasons
only for his conclusions. '2 5 And so "in our
philosophic discussions: the potentest of
all our premises is never mentioned. '26
And had not Mr. Justice Holmes said "the
business of Philosophy is to show that we
are not fools for doing what we want to
do?" 27
Freudian and behavioristic psychologists
degraded man to the level of a rat in a
maze, explained his conduct not in terms
of reason, but of inhibitions, frustrations,
suppressed desires, visceral reactions and
the stimuli of sex. Semanticists came along
like children with the glittering bauble of
ideas as old as Aristotle, which they had
just discovered and dramatized and car-
ried by exaggeration out of all touch with
reality. "Honor," "Ideals," "Justice,"
23 JAMES, PRAGMATISM 7.
24 Id. at 35.
25 Id. at 7.
26 Id. at 8.
27 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 161 (Howe ed.
1942).
"Truth" were mere words, "empty verbal-
isms," "pernicious abstractions." Logic,
philosophy, reason were all discredited.
They were all "the bunk." Only concrete
facts, action, force had any reality.
If man was degraded by anthropologist,
sociologist, psychologist, if his spirituality
and rationality were denied, how stood his
idea of himself and his world after he had
listened to the economic determinists and
the Communists? His free will was denied;
he and all his institutions-his church, his
state, his law-were merely the reflection,
the helpless results of the economic proc-
ess, of society's system of production.
Religion was the opiate of the people, the
state was evil, constitutions were devices
for enslaving the masses to an exploiting
bourgeoisie, law merely the expression of
fraud and force.
With God denied or ignored, man's rea-
son denied, how could one believe in nat-
ural law? And then there was ignorance:
ignorance of true scholastic natural law
because it was the fashion of the times to
equate the medieval centuries - the cen-
turies of Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas
Aquinas and of the flowering of Gothic
art, to the dark ages. Even recently when
intelligent men everywhere have rediscov-
ered the middle ages, you occasionally find
a pretended scholar who repeats old cliches
and dismisses all scholasticism as con-
cerned only with the number of angels on
a needle's point. It makes one think of
Sam Johnson's answer to the woman's
question how he came to define pastern as
the knee of a horse. Said Sam, "Ignorance,
madam, pure ignorance."
And there was a great deal of ignorance
of the natural law. It had two counterfeit
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presentments: the purely rationalistic nat-
ural law of the Enlightenment, and the
nineteenth century laissez faire individual-
ism represented in decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States. As to the first,
when many men thought of natural law
they conceived it to be a theory to the ef-
fect that a complete code of laws could be
spun out of the abstract reasoning of a
man in a closet, good for any people at
any time. This of course ignored two
things about the natural law: first, that,
as pointed out by Aristotle and St. Thomas,
it drew heavily upon the experience of
the race; second, it recognized that prin-
ciples had to be developed in detail by
the positive law and that such develop-
ment imperatively required careful con-
sideration of all the changing contingencies
of time and place. No true adherent of
scholastic law ever thought that every rule
of conduct should be equally applied to the
head-hunting savage in the forest and the
twentieth-century citizen of Megalopolis in
his penthouse enjoying a televised Seventh
Symphony of Beethoven.
A second false picture of natural law
was that it meant merely a philosophy
which would justify the Supreme Court of
the United States in attempting to enforce
Manchester economics and Spencer's So-
cial Statics and in preserving social in-
justices of the status quo by striking down
all social legislation under the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
pity of it was not that humanitarians were
critical of excessive laissez faire and mani-
fest denials of social justice, but that they
turned their indignation against the Con-
stitution and what they regarded as natural
law. The false pictures prevented them
from seeing the true. And they were ig-
norant of the fact that their own desire for
social justice was based upon natural law.
And so, notwithstanding streaks of ideal-
ism, we had a predominantly sensate,
skeptical, secularized and materialistic cul-
ture. In this culture, pragmatism came to
its flowering and fruition.
And thus we come to the final question:
What were the consequences of prag-
matism, particularly as related to the
natural law? James was but one of a pro-
foundly influential pragmatic trio: the
other two were John Dewey and Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes. Both these had a revolu-
tionary effect upon law. Dewey's influence
came indirectly but effectively through his
domination over nearly all American edu-
cational institutions from the kindergarten
through the graduate school. Most of the
members of the bench and bar passed
through these schools and took in prag-
matism with their mother's milk. They
received little or no training in philosophy,
or if they had a few courses in philosophy
they often emerged with the conviction
that philosophy is a tale "full of sound and
fury signifying nothing," the record of dif-
fering opinions not to be reconciled, indeed
not worth reconciling. If they got a little
of philosophy's dust on their feet, they
soon shook it off.
As to Dewey, we quote Pegis in his
essay entitled "The Challenge of Irration-
alism" in the book Race-Nation-Person.
"Mr. Dewey" says Pegis, "has devoted
himself for half a century to making the
blue-prints for the complete dissolution of
the ideals and principles of traditional
Western thought. ' 28 The true philosopher
"must fight the notion that in the beginning
28 PEGIS, The Challenge of Irrationalism, in RACE-
NATION-PERSON 73 (1944).
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there is method; for from such a notion,
in the end, there results only the void."'29
And he points out that Dewey and his
followers "cannot be free in their irra-
tionalism unless Plato, Aristotle and St.
Thomas stand completely discredited." '30
And so they "consider it to be a part of
their aim to eliminate these thinkers in
order to survive." 31
Holmes deserves a book for himself. The
implications of his philosophy may be
summarized, however inadequately, in a
sentence. He had no time for natural law;
positive law is divorced from morals; it is
not based on logic or reason but on ex-
pediency, the felt necessities of the time,
considerations of policy, even judicial
prejudices; its essence is force, will, com-
mand; there is no higher law. Pragmatism
in the law meant that both legislator and
judge were to be denied the help of that
friendly critic, the natural law, that stand-
ard outside the law by which to measure
both statute and judge-made law. The
abandonment of principles for expediency,
of the quest for jurisprudential truth,
meant confusion in the law. Since the test
was workability, men would disagree as to
whether a rule had worked. If the rule was
merely proposed, men were limited to con-
jecture and prophecy as to whether the
rule would work and how. More than that,
since pragmatism has no answer to the
question, "Work towards what?" but leaves
each individual to envisage his own goals,
man, and therefore lawmakers and judges
need not agree on goals. So there is work-
ing at cross purposes, that lack of unity of
29 1d. at 93.
30 Id. at 87.
31 Ibid.
purpose essential to order in any field of
action or thought. So there is a multiplicity
of conflicting statutes, a chaos of confused
judicial opinions, a lawlessness within the
law itself. To the extent that judges are
not reasoning by logical processes from
common major premises but freely legislat-
ing according to each one's notion of ex-
pediency there is a confused babel of judi-
cial voices and an appalling uncertainty in
the law. Moreover, there is no stability in
judicial decisions when decisions change
with changing personnel of the highest
courts; newer justices outvote the old. That
order, that reasonably definite predicta-
bility of the law upon the basis of which
men deal with one another and govern-
ments deal with men, is diminished or
denied. So there is frustrating uncertainty
and insecurity of rights. Particularly is this
true in the field of constitutional law where
there is special need for security in funda-
mental rights and basic legal assumptions.
If pragmatism destroys natural law as
the only possible or enduring basis for
international law and for world peace, so
is its danger greatest in the field of con-
stitutional law. For so wide is judicial
discretion in that field because of the cal-
culatedly vague contours of constitutional
phrases that fundamental rights intended
to be secured by that great charter of our
liberties may be frittered away in succes-
sive decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States: rights of the family, of the
individual, of the churches. If the justices
of that court are pragmatists, if they cease
to believe in God, an ordered universe, and
man as a rational animal made to the
image and likeness of God, if they cease
to believe in natural rights, then by a
(Continued on page 176)
